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In his book Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism2 Kenneth R. Westphal has two main goals: to provide a 
sound transcendental proof for (unqualified) realism (or realism sans phrase) on the basis of Kant’s 
philosophical work, and to show that this proof serves to undermine Kant’s own transcendental idealism – of 
which Westphal adopts a dual-aspect metaphysical interpretation. In this article I will present three serious 
problems in his undertaking. Since there are reviews of Westphal’s book available, I will not offer one here.3   
 
I take Westphal to argue for his theses roughly in three steps. The first step aims to show that noumenal 
causation, i.e., the idea that the thing in itself causally affects our sensibility and thus contributes to the arising of 
appearances, is both coherent in and necessary for Kant’s transcendental idealism. In the second step he aims to 
undermine Kant’s transcendental idealism by two major arguments: first, that it cannot account for 
transcendental affinity, i.e., the associability of the matter of experience, and second, that it fails to satisfactorily 
counter Hume’s scepticism concerning the reality of causality. The final step is to show that Westphal’s own so-
called “neglected alternative” solves these problems without resorting to transcendental idealism.  
 
By “neglected alternative” Westphal refers to Kant’s disjunctive syllogism that either laws of nature are “drawn 
from nature by means of experience” (empiricism) or they are “derived from the laws of the possibility of 
experience in general”4 (transcendental idealism).5 The neglected alternative would on this account be a third 
possibility for explaining the lawfulness of experience (originally “neglected alternative” was about the status of 
space and time). Westphal’s own suggestion is that “our cognitive capacities [are] such that we are only 
receptive, sensitive, or cognitively competent with regard to certain kinds of objects, although those objects 
would have the properties (whatever they may be) that enable us to experience them, regardless of whether we 
existed or experienced them”6. I will not assess Westphal’s proposed neglected alternative in this paper, but 
concentrate instead on how he purports to ground it. 
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Should all these steps succeed, Westphal would both refute Kant’s transcendental idealism and prove realism 
once and for all via transcendental argumentation. Unfortunately, as I will show, his arguments are severely 
lacking. In demonstrating this I will proceed step-by-step in accordance with the division to three phases 
introduced above. 
 
2. Noumenal Causation 
 
The most memorable formulation of the problem of noumenal causation is provided by Kant’s contemporary, 
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi: 
 
Without the presupposition [of the thing in itself] I cannot enter the system, and with the 
presupposition I cannot remain in it.7 
 
The idea is that Kant’s system of transcendental idealism cannot even begin to function without the thing in itself 
somehow influencing the sensibility, but this sort of supersensible affection cannot be assumed within the 
framework of his system. As causality is one of the categories of the understanding, it cannot pertain to the thing 
in itself.  
 
Most defenders of Kant have attempted to circumvent the problem (e.g. Henry Allison with his transcendental 
affection8), but Westphal cannot resort to such a strategy. If he is to prove genuine realism9 on the basis of 
Kant’s transcendental argumentation, the problem Jacobi identifies must be overcome one way or another. This 
is because he must be able to hold on to things in themselves to explain how sensations are possible in the first 
place, even while avoiding the transcendentally idealistic way of explaining causation as merely one of the ways 
in which the human mind organises its experiences. 
 
Westphal’s ambitious argument for noumenal causation can be divided into three parts. (1) Noumenal causation 




                                                
7 Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich: David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus and Realismus. In: F. Roth & F. Köppen (eds.), 
Werke, vol. 2. Darmstadt 1968, 304. 
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9 Westphal’s use of the word “realism” is at times somewhat rhetorical. By “genuine realism” Westphal refers to his unqualified 
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closely related to if not identical with transcendental realism, dropping the qualification “transcendental” seems to confuse 
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2. 1. Meaningfulness of Noumenal Causation 
 
One of the most interesting parts in Westphal’s book is his analysis of Kant’s semantics. He labours to show that 
the underestimation of Kant’s abilities in philosophy of language has lead to ignoring one extremely important 
factor, namely that in addition to a form, the categories have a content as well. Westphal takes two citations from 
Kant: “[A category] can never yield a priori more than the mere rule of the synthesis of that which perception 
may give a posteriori”11, and: “[They] lose all meaning [Bedeutung] and are empty titles for concepts without 
any content when with them I venture outside the field of sense”12.13 
 
According to Westphal, for Kant objective validity requires that, in order for a concept to be fully meaningful, it 
must be able to refer to actual or possible objects in our experience. But Westphal adds that for Kant 
meaningfulness divides into two components, of which referentiality is but one. The other component has to do 
with the “functions of unity” of categories, i.e., their role as synthesisers of intuitions.14 
 
Westphal is here claiming that while categories as such do not have full significance, since they lack empirical 
significance which they have when they are applied to empirical objects, they still have logical significance.15 
Kant himself speaks of the transcendental significance (transzendentale Bedeutung) of categories,16 which, 
according to Westphal, is exactly the same as their transcendental or logical content.17 Briefly put, this would 
mean that categories are not totally meaningless when applied to non-sensible objects. To Westphal’s mind, this 
shows that it is by no means incoherent to apply the category of causality to the thing in itself. 
 
However, when we take a look at the context18 in which Kant speaks of the transcendental significance of 
categories, we see that he intends it in a purely negative sense to oppose their application beyond sensible objects 
(as was done in traditional metaphysics). Westphal is aware of this: he tries to show that categories have 
transcendental use merely in the sense that they allow noumena19 to be thought, not (contra traditional 
metaphysics) known.20 
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Westphal’s use of the word “content” should be viewed with some reservation. While he supports this by 
remarking that if categories had no transcendental content, then they could not be distinguished from one 
another,21 Kant’s own explications22 suggest that categories ought to be distinguished from one other based on 
their form. However, the situation is admittedly unclear since Kant does indeed speak of “transcendental 
content” of categories, albeit rather ambiguously.23 This at least suggests that Westphal may be right. In any 
case, what Westphal here shows is that categories can be applied also transcendentally, although this use is 
merely logical, empty “play of thought” if you will.  
 
2. 2. The Necessity of Noumenal Causation 
 
Westphal submits that the transcendental significance of categories is necessary for Kant’s transcendental 
idealism because things in themselves are reached via transcendental reflection24, which according to Westphal 
in turn requires the application of categories to non-sensible noumena. If categories used in this way had no 
meaning, there would be none for the thing in itself either. But it is necessary for Kant’s analysis of cognition 
that the thing in itself can be thought, one way or another.25 
 
The main idea of this chain of reasoning is that insofar as Kant speaks of noumena or things in themselves at all, 
he must at least think about them,26 which he could not do if categories had no meaning when applied 
transphenomenally. Therefore, to Westphal, it is clear that the transcendental significance of categories is 
necessary for the whole of Kant’s transcendental method: insofar as causality is a category, it is necessary to 
apply it to things in themselves.27 
 
I believe he is correct in a sense. Reflection on our transcendental forms of cognition, which is necessary for 
transcendental idealism, requires such counterfactual thought-experiments in which different categories are 
“tested” on certain ideas in order to determine their possibility. However, since transphenomenally applied 
categories have only logical, not empirical, significance, they have no proper content when used in this manner: 
they are merely empty constructions of thought. The misleading use of the term “content” cannot change this. So 
it must be concluded that even though Westphal is technically correct in that categories can be applied to beings 
of thought independently of experience, nothing has been achieved here that would surpass Kant’s own 
insistence that, thus used, they are only “empty titles for concepts without any content”28. 
                                                
21 KTPR, 43. 
22 E.g. KrV, A 248/B 305. 
23 See e.g. KrV, A 79/B 105. 
24 While I appreciate the emphasis Westphal puts on Kant’s transcendental reflection, I find his account of it regrettably careless. 
He does not seem to sufficiently distinguish between transcendental reflection and reflection in general. Because Kant gives a 
very precise and restricted definition for transcendental reflection (KrV, A 261/B 317), it cannot be (at least uncritically) treated 
as mere reflection directed at our transcendental forms of cognition. Apart from my decision to not use the term myself, this 
problem is bypassed in this article. 
25 KTPR, 50f. 
26 It is worth remarking that this much is said by Kant himself. See e.g. KrV, Bxxvi-xxvii. 
27 KTPR, 51. 
28 KrV, A 679/B 707. 
2. 3. The Proof of Noumenal Causation 
 
Westphal is fully aware that since noumenal causation is not sensible, it cannot occur in space or time – those 
being the forms of sensibility. In effect this means that it must be atemporal and aspatial causation, in which 
case we lose for instance the idea that cause temporally precedes its effect. For things in themselves he postulates 
r-temporality (from the word real) which is analogous to temporality of appearances. He claims that even though 
he cannot formulate a proof for r-temporality (or for r-spatiality), it cannot at least be dismissed out of hand – 
otherwise illegitimate, positive claims about the thing in itself would be made. R-temporality makes it possible 
for Westphal to the handle noumenal causation.29 In other words, the idea is that since the thought of causality 
essentially involves some kind of thought of precedence and succession that cannot in noumenal causation be 
expressed temporally, alternative means for preserving this idea must be developed. This r-temporality is quite 
clearly a neglected alternative, and analogous to temporality. Even more importantly, it is merely formally 
analogous, since it reproduces only the formal order of temporality.  
 
It is true that Westphal’s stance is irrefutable, for should it be argued that he is in error, something substantial 
about the thing in itself would consequently be claimed. On the other hand it must be said, paralleling Allison in 
his response to Lorne Falkenstein’s similar position,30 that as such his claim cannot be refuted mostly because it 
cannot be comprehended either. 
 
In any case, according to Westphal this proves that atemporal causation is logically and metaphysically possible 
– although since he presents no ontological status for it, its metaphysical feasibility must surely be questioned. 
He does grant that the stance he puts forth, including r-temporality, might eventually be shown to be erroneous.31 
This concession seems partly rhetorical, however, since there seems to be no way of even beginning to falsify r-
temporality as it stands. Furthermore, since Kant himself makes a sharp distinction between logical and 
metaphysical (real) possibility,32 Westphal’s fault lies not merely in optimism but in disregarding one of Kant’s 
important distinctions. 
 
It is difficult to see what exactly Westphal is trying to prove. If we keep to the formal level, his noumenal 
causation is virtually indistinguishable from e.g. Allison’s transcendental affection – with the difference that 
Westphal specifically holds on to the causal status of this affection. As far as I can see, his arguments do suffice 
for this, because they show that it is necessary in Kant’s transcendental idealism to think of some kind of an 
analogy for causality as prevailing between the thing in itself and the cognition. He cannot be satisfied with this, 
however, if and when he wants to produce a genuinely metaphysical interpretation. For him noumenal causation 
must be expressly causation. This does not follow, however, for the simple reason that causation based on r-
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temporality is as such precisely merely analogous to temporal or empirical causation. To counter this sort of 
argument expressed here, he remarks in a surprisingly haphazard manner that: 
 
In this regard, one might urge that Kant ought to speak only of the thing in itself as “grounding,” 
but not as “causing,” sensory affection. This is a nicety Kant does and can overlook. [...] What 
matters more than the term is whether the term is used in a context in which determinate 
empirical judgments are possible. No such judgments are possible in the context of reflecting 
transcendentally on the source or nature of sensory affection. So long as this basic point is kept 
in mind, either term can be used indifferently, just as Kant does.33 
 
I think this is extremely misleading. Insofar as causation has an empirical meaning, the term in question cannot 
be used in the same sense in contexts that are not about possible empirical judgments. It is very dangerous to 
create this sort of equivocation in which causation is understood differently in one situation than in another, 
especially since this difference in meaning can in fact be represented by distinguishing between causing and 
grounding. In other words, it should sooner be concluded either that Kant himself mixes up his concepts (which 
would definitely not be unheard of), or that the expression “causation” is used in twofold meaning in Kant’s 
philosophy (which would not be unprecedented either). Westphal’s claim that Kant overlooks the said “nicety” 
seems to be ungrounded as well: in the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant makes it explicit that in 
supersensible contexts the word “cause” (Ursache) signifies merely the “ground” (Grund).34 “Causation” in 
empirical contexts has a different meaning than “causation” in non-empirical ones, and “using the term 
indifferently” cannot change this: noumenal causation remains merely analogous to empirical causation and my 
criticism holds.  
 
The lack or weakness of arguments does not of course yet show that Westphal’s interpretation of noumenal 
causation is erroneous. Indeed, it can be admitted that noumenal causation would be proper causation if the 
division between transcendental and empirical that prevails in Kant’s philosophy could be eliminated, i.e., if it 
could be shown that the field of applicability of categories is not (contra “official” Kant) restricted to empirical 
reality after all. This seems to be exactly what Westphal purports to do as well, as is made evident by his later 
attempts to formulate on the basis of transcendental affinity such a neglected alternative that would in effect 
abolish this division. 
 
Westphal aims to show that, in a sense, empirical causation is secondary to noumenal causation by 
demonstrating that transcendental idealism is a metaphysical theory, not a methodological commitment. 
However, his arguments seem so lacking and half-baked here that I suspect that even he does not believe them. 
In a very problematic passage he claims strikingly briefly that Kant’s transcendental idealism is metaphysical 
since on its basis the whole of spatiotemporal, empirically real world is mere appearance for us, and thus exists 
only in our representing it: 
 
According to transcendental idealism, “causal relations” among “phenomenal objects” is 
commonsense shorthand for [...] representations of certain rule-like relations among manifest 
objects or events. From the transcendental level alone can we understand that causal relations in 
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the empirical realm are not self-sufficient; they are nothing but relations constructable by us in 
our representing manifest objects and events. Kant’s transcendental idealism is a baroque, 
decidedly metaphysical view.35 
 
I cannot see, however, how on these grounds the metaphysical nature of transcendental idealism has been shown. 
Sooner it would seem to have been dogmatically assumed. It is difficult to grasp how Westphal can bypass the 
whole debate on the methodological or metaphysical nature of transcendental idealism with such a haphazard 
claim – especially since he takes Allison to be his main adversary. According to Westphal, the fact that causal 
relations of empirical world are not self-sufficient in transcendental idealism apparently directly implies its 
metaphysical nature. However, such implication remains undemonstrated. Moreover, the fact that empirical 
causation is not “self-sufficient” does by no means imply that it is not proper causation at all: causation can well 
be “nothing but relations constructable by us” without thus being “secondary” in any sense. To claim otherwise 
would be to presuppose some higher order causality and in effect to beg the question against the methodological 
readings. Westphal also refers to Kant’s manner of speaking of the empirical world as a mere world of 
appearances.36 However, the idea of methodological readings is exactly that appearances are not to be interpreted 
as some sort of “second class objects” beyond which a kind of True World lies. Therefore there is little else to do 
but conclude that Westphal ends up merely presupposing the metaphysical interpretation, not in any way 
demonstrating it. Furthermore, since Westphal’s reading leads Kant’s transcendental idealism to a contradiction, 
one could consider this, if not yet a reductio ad absurdum of his reading, at least a good reason to doubt it. 
 
Perhaps Westphal is implicitly claiming that since noumenal causation is primary, the causal relations of 
empirical world turn out to be secondary. But this would follow only if noumenal causation really were 
causation proper. Unfortunately he could not support this claim, for, as I remarked before, the grounds for this 
are equally insufficient since noumenal causation is merely analogous to empirical causation. If on the other 
hand it is not causation at all, we would end up with an Allisonian model in which the only proper causation lies 
in the causal relations of the empirical world, which is quite the contrary to Westphal’s aim. 
 
In any case, Westphal does admit that a move from permissibility of thought to objective reality is still to be 
made, that is, from the fact that we can think along these lines to that we should or even must do so. According 
to him, noumenal causation cannot be granted objective reality solely within Kant’s theoretical philosophy, but it 
has to be based on his practical philosophy, as a postulate of practical reason.37 This as such shows that Westphal 
does not intend his above argument from the supposed metaphysical nature of transcendental idealism as a 
serious or conclusive one. It is unfortunate that Westphal does not develop his intriguing idea much further, and 
indeed says that a "brief remark must suffice for now"38. Given the extremely central role of the idea of 
noumenal causation as a practical postulate, his decision is a problematic one. Since he offers only more or less 
cursory remarks on the subject, it is not prudent to dwell on the matter further. Nonetheless, I have some 
reservations about applying a practical postulate to discussions about realism and idealism. Not only is the 
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ontological status of the practical postulates problematic (as Westphal himself notes39), the whole relationship 
between Kant's practical and theoretical philosophy is a source of much controversy. 
 
Basically what we are left with is at best the logical possibility of noumenal causation. The reference to practical 
philosophy underscores this. Indeed, Westphal's next step is to attack transcendental idealism itself with the 
purpose of showing that it is insufficient. If he could show this along with the insufficiency of empiricism, the 
modal status of his neglected alternative would rise to necessary since it would not only be one possible way to 
account for the possibility of experience, but in fact the only one. The function of the reference to practical 
postulates is merely to show that this only surviving explanation Westphal offers is indeed tenable.  
 
3. Transcendental Affinity 
 
One of the central claims of Kant’s transcendental deduction is that without a sufficient orderliness of the 
intuited world self-consciousness would not be possible.40 Westphal aptly calls the lack of such order 
“transcendental chaos”41. Kant names the thesis that orderliness of intuition is a necessary condition for 
cognitive experience transcendental affinity (transzendental Affinität).42 The idea is that in order for us to 
organise our experiences in a sensible way in the first place, there must be something in the matter of experience 
that makes it possible to compare and connect them with one another. Kant defines it as follows: “The ground of 
the possibility of the association of the manifold, insofar as it lies in the object, is called the affinity of the 
manifold”43. According to Westphal, transcendental affinity ultimately refutes transcendental idealism and opens 
up a way for his neglected alternative. I will not consider the actual neglected alternative in this paper, since my 
primary aim is to show that his arguments for it fail of their own accord. 
 
3. 1. Transcendental Affinity as a Formal and a Material Condition 
 
According to Westphal, transcendental affinity is a problem for Kant because it is a “nonsubjective, necessary 
condition for the possibility of self-conscious experience which is both material and formal, though neither 
intuitive nor conceptual”44. By nonsubjectivity Westphal means that the said condition is not a condition set for 
the object by the subject, unlike categories or forms of sensibility. Instead, it is a property of the objects 
themselves, a property that is at the same time a necessary condition for self-conscious experience. This is not a 
problem for Kant’s philosophy as such, since for instance the thing in itself that is both accepted and required by 
his philosophy is this kind of a condition. It becomes a problem only if it is both a formal and a material 
condition. A material condition concerns the given part of experience, whereas a formal condition concerns the 
part of experience we ourselves have set in it. It is important to realise that if a condition were both formal and 
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41 KTPR, 93. 
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44 KTPR, 72. 
material simultaneously, it would violate transcendental idealism’s vital dichotomy between matter given 
externally and form imposed by the subject. In addition, if transcendental affinity is indeed such a condition, it 
can be neither sensible nor conceptual since for Kant the conditions of the sensibility and understanding concern 
only the form of experience. 
 
Given its extremely central role, Westphal is surprisingly vague on what “formal condition” in fact means – he 
only gives arguments as to why a condition must be formal without properly explicating the features of such a 
condition. According to Kant appearances have both a matter and a form. The former corresponds roughly to 
what appears in the appearance and the latter to how it appears. On this account, a material condition of 
appearances would be something that is necessary for there to be a what-part, whereas a formal condition would 
be something that is necessary for there to be a how-part. Taken together, these constitute the conditions for there 
being appearances. It is important to realise that there could be a what-part without a how-part, and vice versa, 
even though in such a case there would be no appearances to experience. In short: a material condition must be a 
function of the matter of appearances, and a formal condition correspondingly a function of the form of 
appearances. Westphal explicitly grants the part concerning matter, so it seems appropriate to assume that he 
agrees on the formal, analogous side as well.45  
 
Westphal argues that if transcendental affinity is indeed both a formal and a material condition, Kant’s 
philosophy would seem to be forced to either of these extremes: if this condition is subjective, Berkeleyan 
idealism follows, in which the cognition produces both (at least some of the) matter and form of experience;46 on 
the other hand, if this condition is objective, realism47 follows in which both matter and form of experience are 
given to us. Westphal himself opts for the latter, realistic stance: the function of the synthesis by the subject is 
only to reconstruct the order in nature, not to construct it.48 
 
The most crucial part of Westphal’s argument is the claim that transcendental affinity is both a formal and a 
material condition for the possibility of experience. However, I submit that while he is correct in claiming that 
transcendental affinity is a material condition, he errs in that it is also a formal one.  
 
According to Westphal the reasons for the alleged formality and materiality of transcendental affinity are as 
follows: 
 
This condition is both “material,” because it must be a function of the characteristics of the 
objects we experience (or, analogously, of the matter of our sensations), and yet it is also 
“formal,” because it concerns the relations among the material (qualitative) characteristics of the 
objects we experience.49 
                                                
45 KTPR, 87. 
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experiences are not produced solely by the perceiving subject. God, as extraneous to the subject, is also required. 
47 Again I must object Westphal’s use of realism. This is not empirical realism, but it might be transcendental realism. In any 
case, it is Westphal’s unqualified realism.  
48 KTPR, 90, 112. 
49 KTPR, 87. 
He also gives separate arguments for both its materiality and formality: 
 
Granting that combination is a result of intellectual synthesis, whereby “combination” would 
designate the effected complex of elements (whether sensory or conceptual), combinability [i.e., 
affinity] must be a function of the elements thus combined.50  
 
Transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold is a “formal” condition for the possibility of 
experience, because it allows objects to be ordered.51 
 
As a summary it can be said that according to him transcendental affinity is a formal condition because, first, 
(F1) it concerns relations, and second, (F2) it is a condition for ordering objects. It is a material condition 
because (M) it is a property of objects themselves. The latter I will accept as it stands, since Kant’s words leave 
little room for interpretation.52 
 
I submit that while (M) is correct, both (F1) and (F2) are flawed. This means that transcendental affinity is a 
material condition but not a formal one, just like Kant would have it. Consequently, it does not point to any 
incoherence in transcendental idealism. 
 
3. 2. Transcendental Affinity as a Condition for Ordering Objects 
 
(F2) fails, for the fact that something “allows objects to be ordered” (i.e., is a condition for their ordering, as it 
must be interpreted in this context) does not yet make it a formal condition. Otherwise the absurdity would 
follow that the thing in itself is also a form of experience, since without it there would be nothing to order and 
thus no ordering. Kant does say, however, that “that [...] which allows the manifold of appearance to be ordered 
in certain relations I call the form of appearance”53. For this to make sense, he must mean by “allowing” that 
without a form the manifold of appearance cannot be ordered in certain relations, i.e., that this cannot be done 
solely on the basis of the matter of appearances. This is supported by the fact that Kant here contrasts form with 
matter. That is to say that on this account he can not mean that anything working as a condition for there being a 
manifold of appearance intuited as ordered in certain relations would constitute a form of appearance, but simply 
that without the form of experience the manifold could not be intuited.  
 
In the Amphiboly Kant is very explicit that the matter “signifies the determinable in general” and the form “its 
determination”54. Insofar as “determination” refers to an act of determining, i.e., of ordering into relations, form 
is either the ordering or the order itself distinguished from that which is ordered.55 Thus it should be concluded 
                                                
50 KTPR, 89. 
51 KTPR, 91. 
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53 “dasjenige [...], welches macht, daß das Mannigfaltige der Erscheinung in gewissen Verhältnissen geordnet werden kann, 
nenne ich die Form der Erscheinung” (KrV, B 34). (A-edition reads “geordnet, angeschauet wird” (KrV, A 20) instead of 
“geordnet werden kann”.) 
54 “bedeutet das Bestimmbare überhaupt” and “dessen Bestimmung” (KrV, A 266/B 322). 
55 The relationship between the terms "determining", "ordering", "associating" and "relating" may be unclear. Determining 
basically means individuating in the sense that if an object is fully determined, it is individuated as a particular object. 
Determination therefore requires determining the properties belonging to an object as well as its relationship with other objects. 
that form is something that “allows objects to be ordered” only in a restricted sense: it is the complex of relations 
of the manifold of appearance. Since transcendental affinity is only a condition for there to be such a complex of 
relations, there is no basis for claiming that it would be a formal condition. In short: it is not a formal condition, 
but a condition for (applying) form. 
 
The idea is that every appearance is a combination of matter and form. Since these two make appearances 
possible, they must be logically prior to appearances. In order for an appearance to manifest itself, its matter and 
form must be combined, i.e., a form must be applied to or imposed on the given matter. Transcendental affinity 
is a condition for this application of form, but it is not a formal condition, that is, a function of the form of 
appearances.  
 
This is admittedly a tricky point, but I am confident that careful deliberation on this shows that my view is 
correct. Both my and Westphal's readings are compatible with what Kant says in the above-mentioned B 34 
quote, but I think that Westphal's interpretation suffers from serious incoherence with regard to the rest of what 
Kant says about transcendental affinity, as well as about the distinction between matter and form of appearances. 
Since he also appears to use this (mis)reading of Kant against the rest of his philosophy, his strategy does not 
seem very charitable.  
 
3. 3. Transcendental Affinity and Relations 
 
The problem with (F1) also serves to underscore the analysis of the preceding section. That something “concerns 
relations” does not yet mean that it is a formal condition, because matter too fulfils this criterion by being that 
which is related in relations. The problem is that Westphal’s use of the term “concern” is ambiguous. The form 
must actually “concern” relations in a very specific way: it must either be the relations between the matter of 
appearance or be the act of setting the matter into relations. In the Amphiboly Kant explicates via examples the 
correct usage of form:  
 
In every judgment one can call the given concepts logical matter (for judgment), their 
 relation (by means of the copula) the form of the judgment. In every being its components 
(essentialia) are the matter; the way in which they are connected in a thing, the essential form.56 
 
It seems that the correct reading of form with regard to relations is that the complex of the relations themselves 
constitute the form of appearance. Transcendental affinity is not on this account a formal condition, since it is 
merely a condition for the possibility of this complex of relations. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
This is equal to determining the objects and properties associated with the given thing. Quite clearly relating also requires 
ordering: placing things into relations. While these terms thus have distinct meanings, their intimate connection allows for their 
quite free usage in this context. What is important is that all of these are functions of the form of experience and all are part of 
the determination of objects, i.e., of moulding the manifold of sensory affection into cognisable objects. 
56 “In jedem Urteile kann man die gegebenen Begriffe logische Materie (zum Urteile), das Verhältnis derselben (vermittelst der 
Kopula) die Form des Urteils nennen. In jedem Wesen sind die Bestandstücke desselben (essentialia) die Materie; die Art, wie 
sie in einem Dinge verknüpft sind, die wesentliche Form.” (KrV, A 266/B 322.) 
Even with the risk of being repetitious, the crux of my criticism is: Westphal conflates “formal condition” with 
“condition for form”. Associability of something is merely a condition for associating it, but not as such part of 
the (act of) associating itself. Analogically, that there is coffee in the pan is a material condition for the 
possibility of the act of pouring that coffee in a mug, but not part of the act of pouring itself. It is clear enough 
that the affinity or associability, as a property of an object, is not a function of the form of the object, but merely 
a condition for giving a form to it, i.e., for associating, relating or determining appearances with regard to one 
another, quite as the term “associability” suggests (since it is a property that allows for associating). It is also 
equally clear that this is (merely) a material condition in accordance with (M). I hope that the following 
explication suffices to convince even the most unconvinced reader. 
 
It can be said that the ordered number pair (a, b) is set into the form of coordinate system in (analytic) geometry 
when we represent it as a point in a coordinate plane. In this kind of case the number pair itself is the matter, the 
information if you will, of a point in the coordinate plane, whereas the location of the point within the coordinate 
system (and its image specifically as a point) is its form. This location constitutes of the complex of relations the 
point has to every other (possible as well as actual) point in the coordinate plane. The principle of transcendental 
affinity says (only) that there must be something in the number pair (a, b) that makes it possible to represent it in 
e.g. the said coordinate system. As a property of the number pair it is a material condition. It is as such also a 
condition for giving a form to the number pair, i.e., for representing it in a coordinate plane – but not a formal 
condition, or a condition that would be set by the form (the coordinate system). Also, it is again worth 
emphasising that we can have a number pair (matter) without a coordinate system (form), and a coordinate 
system without a number pair, even though only their conjunction gives birth to a coordinate point (appearance).  
 
This also allows for a clear explication as to why exactly Westphal's claim that the affinity concerns relations is 
flawed. For example, the number pairs (a, b) and (c, d) do not as such include a relation to each other. They are 
set into a relation only when they are set into the same form: for instance they might determine a straight line in 
xy-plane, or perhaps a pair of complex numbers. Precisely this is one of Kant’s main philosophical points: the 
form is that via which sensations are placed in relations. Sensations then do not actually have any relation to 
each other as such since they are thought separately and given singularly – only their connection in the mind 
grants them a form and subsequently a relation to one another. This is the essence of Kant’s principle of 
synthetic unity of apperception.57 One does not even have to enter Kant’s system to understand (if not ultimately 
agree on) the idea that relations among qualitative features are constructed by the cognition that compares them 
according to certain perceived similarity. Simply put: two red objects need not be in any sort of relation with one 
another just because they are red, but they do of course share the same common property that allows for them to 
be thus related. Again the same point emerges: transcendental affinity is merely a condition for form, and as such 
it is strictly material. 
 
                                                
57 Cf. especially KrV, B 129-31, B 136-39. 
I wish to emphasise, however, that in a certain important sense I deem Westphal to be correct: there has to be 
something in the matter of sensations that can be called orderliness even before we place it there.58 In a way the 
idea is that the matter must be accompanied by some sort of a “building plan”, on the basis of which the mind 
imposes a form on it (or organises it into a form) – in other case nothing would prevent total perceptual chaos. 
For example, even if we were to accept the thesis that we impose causality into the world ourselves, it still does 
not follow from this that the causal relations between things would themselves be any more arbitrary than 
decidable by us: we do not determine particular causes, i.e. what causes what, but only the form in which this 
connection is represented.  
 
This was well understood by Kant who formulated the principle of transcendental affinity to prevent this sort of 
chaos. He can and indeed should admit the pre-cognitive regularity of things. He can minimise it however: since 
it is order beyond all of our cognitive capabilities, nothing substantial can be said of it. It is a necessary condition 
for experience that we must think that the thing in itself has some kind of incomprehensible (non-formal) 
regularity, of which nothing more can be said. This is essentially the same point I made earlier about the 
(merely) analogous nature of noumenal causation. Westphal claims that Kant can only prove the necessity of 
such transcendental affinity on subjective basis, but not ground it on these subjective foundations, that is, 
transcendental idealism cannot explain the origin of transcendental affinity.59 This is absolutely correct, but Kant 
does not need to do that either. Faithful to his transcendental method, he argues merely that experience would 
not be possible without transcendental affinity, and since we nonetheless do experience, we must also postulate 
transcendental affinity. He does not need to explain why there is transcendental affinity, no more than he must 
explain why there are things in themselves – indeed no more than a physicist should have to be able to answer 
the question as to why there was a Big Bang. 
 
I conclude that Westphal fails to undermine transcendental idealism via transcendental affinity, since 
transcendental idealism is quite compatible with it. As long as transcendental idealism holds, Westphal’s 
neglected alternative remains a mere possibility.  
 
4. Analogies of Experience and the Metaphysical Causal Thesis 
 
Westphal begins a second line of attack against transcendental idealism through Kant's transcendental and 
metaphysical causal theses. The former is the claim that "every event has a cause"60 and the latter that "every 
physical event has an external cause"61. According to Westphal, the transcendental causal thesis requires the 
metaphysical one, which in turn depends on some metaphysical presuppositions. Since transcendental idealism is 
meant to provide a basis for metaphysics, and not vice versa, no metaphysical presuppositions whatsoever can 
inhere in its foundations. 
                                                
58 With reference to coordinates, it is instructive to note that the number pair (a, b) cannot be represented in a, say, three-
dimensional coordinate system (x, y, z), at least not without additional information. In other words, there must be some kind of 
structural isomorphism here, just like Westphal (and e.g. Falkenstein as referred earlier) holds. 
59 KTPR, 114. 
60 KTPR, 134; cf. KrV, A176f./B 218, A 191/B 236, A 195/B 240. 
61 KTPR, 143, emphasis mine; cf. MAN, AA 04: 543. 
Structurally speaking, Westphal's argument divides into two parts. First he aims to demonstrate that the 
transcendental causal thesis introduced in the Analogies of Experience of the Critique of Pure Reason does 
indeed require the metaphysical causal thesis, which is in turn proved in the Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Science (Foundations for short). The second part purports to show that the arguments given in the 
Foundations are insufficient. Should this line of criticism succeed, it would undermine the transcendental causal 
thesis and consequently Kant's response to Hume. This in turn would, to Westphal's mind, severely weaken the 
plausibility of transcendental idealism – perhaps enough to justify its abandonment.62 Even though I have 
reservations about how detrimental this would be for transcendental idealism, I will not concern myself with the 
overall feasibility of Westphal’s tactic here.63  
 
Westphal's critique advances as follows. First he remarks that all three Analogies form a "tightly integrated set of 
mutually supporting principles"64 and that on this account the Third Analogy cannot be separated from the other 
two. Secondly, Westphal contends that the Third Analogy is based on metaphysical presuppositions.65 
Consequently all of the Analogies rely on the said presuppositions.66 From this it would follow that the 
Analogies of Experience, while meant to be handled purely on a transcendental level, would in fact be ultimately 
based on metaphysical foundations. Hence Westphal submits that transcendental philosophy presupposes rather 
than defines metaphysics.67 
 
I grant Westphal the first step. Firstly, it is nowadays accepted widely that the Analogies are to be taken as a 
unit.68 Secondly, Kant himself provides some support for this by speaking of the "general principle"69 of the 
Analogies of Experience. The second step, however, calls for more scrutiny. Westphal's basic argument is that 
since the Third Analogy deals with physical objects in space, Kant should argue for the metaphysical causal 
thesis instead of the transcendental one70. More precisely, the metaphysical causal thesis is required because 
Kant allegedly adheres to three metaphysical presuppositions in the Third Analogy: (MP1) external, transeunt 
                                                
62 KTPR, 225f. 
63 It is quite indisputable that Kant laboured to show in the Critique of Pure Reason that Hume's scepticism about causality is 
misplaced. However, I am not convinced that failing in this would constitute the failure of transcendental idealism itself. One 
might well submit both that transcendental idealism is sound and that causality is not real. This would only mean that causality is 
not a category. In other words, causality would have the same status as for instance fate, the concept of which cannot, 
according to Kant, be justified de jure (KrV, A 84/B 117). Obviously this would wreak havoc within Kant's specific philosophical 
architectonic, but would not as such work against the possibility, or even the plausibility, of transcendental idealism as a general 
philosophical view. 
64 KTPR, 154. 
65 KTPR, 165f. 
66 KTPR, 133. 
67 KTPR, 170f. 
68 See e.g. Allison, Henry E.: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, an Interpretation and Defense, revised and enlarged edition. New 
Haven and London 2004, 229; and Guyer, Paul: Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. Cambridge 1987, 168-275. 
69 “Der allgemeine Grundsatz derselben” (KrV, A 176). The B-edition reads “Their principle” / “Das Prinzip derselben” (B 218). 
However, due to both the ambiguity in expression and the disparity between the editions, I do not consider this textual evidence 
decisive as such. 
70 KTPR, 127-29. 
causal interaction among distinct physical substances; (MP2) plurality of substances; and (MP3) lifelessness of 
matter.71 I will analyse each in turn to show that the Third Analogy in fact does not rest on these presuppositions. 
 
In (MP1) the crux is that the causal interaction is between physical substances. Westphal summarises that the 
aim of the Third Analogy is to prove “the thesis that all physical events have external causes”72. However, 
Westphal errs (repeatedly) as to what conclusion Kant labours to draw in the Third Analogy. What is remarkable 
is that Kant does not even once mention the term “physical” in the whole of the Analogies, so it hardly seems 
prima facie justified to characterise the Third Analogy using that concept. Since “physical events” are very 
closely related to “material events” (i.e., events concerning matter) and matter is expressly considered in the 
Foundations, Westphal's argument borders on question begging. In fact, the Third Analogy can be summarised 
in Kant’s following words: “Thus it is necessary for all substances in appearance, insofar as they are 
simultaneous, to stand in a thoroughgoing community of interaction with each other.”73 While it is true that the 
substances Kant speaks of are supposed to be external to one another, there is no mention of physicality.74  
 
One might perhaps defend Westphal by insisting that external causes must be physical and material causes, but 
since the Foundations are meant to apply the transcendental principles of the Analogies to the empirical concept 
of matter, that would simply begs the question against Kant, since he distinguishes community between 
substances in space from community among (physical) matter in space. These are to be treated on different 
levels of abstraction: the first on a transcendental level in the Critique of Pure Reason, the latter on an empirical 
level in the Foundations. The crucial difference is that the former analysis does not rest on any empirical 
concepts whereas the latter involves application of the empirical concept of matter. On this account there is no 
basis for claiming that in the Third Analogy Kant would be arguing for transeunt causal interaction among 
distinct physical substances. 
 
Westphal defends (MP1) also by claiming that whatever Kant is trying to prove, his principle of community, as 
argued for in the Third Analogy, nonetheless requires the empirical concept of matter and thus “incorporate[s] a 
metaphysical content”75 into the Critique of Pure Reason. Due to the density of Westphal’s argumentation, I will 
quote him directly: 
 
On the basis of the principles defended in the Analogies of Experience, distinguishing changes 
of state from coexisting states of affairs requires distinguishing nonspatial changes of states from 
changes of place [...]. However, changes of place can only be identified if one can identify 
bodies that change place, and one can only identify bodies that change place if one has a concept 
of bodies that can change place. This concept is (or at least includes) the concept of “the 
moveable in space,” and this concept is an empirical concept.76 
                                                
71 KTPR, 157, 161, respectively. 
72 KTPR, 26; cf. also KTPR, 157. 
73 “Also ist es allen Substanzen in der Erscheinung, so fern sie zugleich sind, notwendig, in durchgängiger Gemeinschaft der 
Wechselwirkung unter einander zu stehen.” (KrV, A 213/B 260.) 
74 Kant uses the term ‘matter’ once (KrV, A 213/B 260), but only as an example when speaking about heavenly bodies and light. 
The term has no constitutive role in the proof offered in the Third Analogy. On externality, see e.g. KrV, B 258. 
75 KTPR, 159. 
76 KTPR, 159. 
“The moveable in space” is Kant’s empirical characterisation of matter in the Foundations, and this is the crux 
of Westphal’s argument. However, the Third Analogy (and the Analogies in general) sets off with the fact that 
we do identify these things. Obviously, since I can function in the world, I am able to identify when bodies 
change place and when they alter their states. Kant’s argument runs from the fact that I can experience 
simultaneity to establishing that only thoroughgoing causal interaction among substances makes this possible. It 
may well be that in addition to this it can be proved, perhaps among Westphal’s lines, that I must also have the 
(empirical) concept of “the moveable in space”. Thus there is no reason to suppose that the Third Analogy 
requires the concept of matter, but instead it seems that in the Foundations Kant is simply extending the results 
of the Third Analogy to physical matter. This order is very important since the issue at stake is whether Kant's 
metaphysics requires transcendental tenets or vice versa.  
 
With regard to (MP2), Westphal claims that the Analogies do not entail substance pluralism, but merely 
presuppose it.77 The reasoning behind this accusation is that in the Third Analogy Kant speaks of substances in 
plural as well as in singular, yet there is nothing in it to justify the plural form. As far as I can see, by substance 
pluralism Westphal can mean either the view that (SP1) there are different kinds of substances (such as material 
and spiritual), or that (SP2) the substances are of the same kind yet the substratum of each thing is a distinct 
substance. 
 
Kant's own definition of substance is a familiar one: it is "the substratum of everything real, i.e., everything that 
belongs to the existence of things"78. Now, Kant's usage of the terms "substances" and "things" side by side 
throughout the Analogies seems to imply that in this context he has in mind things stripped of their secondary 
qualities, i.e., the underlying parts or segments of an all-encompassing substance corresponding to given things 
(regardless of the secondary qualities they might have). The idea would be, then, that Kant is speaking about the 
parts of substance that individual things cut out of it, not of different kinds of substances. This would explain 
why he quite carelessly speaks of things and substances indiscriminately: when he says that substances A and B 
influence each other he must mean merely that the parts of substances corresponding to things A and B influence 
each other.79 Therefore the claim that Kant would adhere to (SP1) is unfounded. 
 
On the other hand, (SP2), in which the substances are quantitatively distinct, does not seem particularly 
problematic. It suffices for Kant and his causal interaction in the Analogies that separate parts of substances 
(things) are in a thoroughgoing interaction with one another. These parts may or may not be distinct substances, 
since the required interaction can equally well be between parts of one all-encompassing substance as between 
distinct substances. The crux of the matter is that Kant does not need any sort of presupposition of substance 
pluralism in the Third Analogy, regardless of what he says or even what he means. As far as I can see, the 
problem of the number of substances is chiefly semantic (especially since, if Kant had used merely the singular 
form, he could be charged of presupposing substance monism). Westphal seems to merely overemphasise Kant’s 
                                                
77 KTPR, 163f. 
78 “das Substrat alles Realen, d. i. zur Existenz der Dinge gehörigen” (KrV, A 181/B 225). 
79 See also Allison, Henry E.: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, an Interpretation and Defense, revised and enlarged edition. New 
Haven and London 2004, 246. 
usage of the plural form; the alleged substance pluralism of the Analogies can easily be interpreted as a mere 
façon de parler without any damage to Kant’s thesis. It is worth noting that Westphal too acknowledges that the 
principle in the Third Analogy can be accounted for even in a Spinozistic substance monism,80 which implies 
that Westphal too agrees that Kant's thesis is quite compatible with substance monism. All in all, there seems to 
be no convincing reasons for accepting (MP2).  
 
According to (MP3), Kant's Third Analogy rests on the lifelessness of matter. Westphal claims that this is 
because Kant fails to rule out hylozoism, i.e., the view espoused for instance by Leibniz that matter has internal 
determinations. The problem is that the Third Analogy simply does not need to rule it out either, since the 
conclusion argued for in it is: “it is necessary for all substances in appearance, insofar as they are simultaneous, 
to stand in a thoroughgoing community of interaction with each other”81. This is equal to claiming that there is 
external causality between things. Specifically Kant does not argue, nor does he need to, that there is only 
external causality. Indeed, Westphal’s analysis of (MP3) seems to suffer from a kind of modal blunder: the Third 
Analogy shows that things must be in causal interaction with one another, but not that every change in them 
should be produced by some external influence – which is a stronger claim and is argued for only in the 
Foundations. Thus Westphal errs when he claims that the conclusion of the Third Analogy requires refutation of 
hylozoism. Instead the Third Analogy leaves, and can leave, the matter open. 
 
Given that all three allegations of metaphysical presuppositions are unfounded, little remains of the force of the 
argument according to which Kant's Analogies are grounded on metaphysical examinations of the Foundations. 
Thus the second line of argumentation against the tenability of transcendental idealism is unconvincing. 
Consequently, Westphal's neglected alternative remains a mere, undemonstrated possibility. 
 
5. Parting Words 
 
Westphal’s book is a detailed and impressive piece of work. He has done his research generally well and argues 
extensively and sharply for his theses. Unfortunately his acuity is selective and fails at several key points. In fact, 
at times he argues for some rather trivial point in exhausting detail whereas several extremely important claims, 
especially those regarding the metaphysical nature of Kant’s transcendental idealism, are discussed hastily in 
mere few lines.  
 
I have attempted to point out three crucial flaws in Westphal’s overall thesis. First, Westphal’s defence of 
noumenal causation remains lacking: he manages to show only its thinkability, which is something that Kant, 
too, readily admits. Since Kant’s overall project in the Critique of Pure Reason is more or less to draw a 
boundary between what can be cognised and what only thought, this seems to bypass the whole general point he 
is trying to make. Second, instead of proving that transcendental affinity is both a formal and a material 
condition for the possibility of experience, Westphal ends up with showing it to be a material condition for (the 
possibility of) form – just like Kant would have it. Third, Westphal’s attempt to show that the Analogies of 
                                                
80 KTPR, 161. 
81 See note 72 above. 
Experience rest on metaphysical presuppositions either fails or is severely lacking as he seems to misconstrue the 
claims and goals Kant has in the Analogies. 
 
Westphal’s book is nonetheless an intriguing and important opening in the normally somewhat classless debate 
concerning naturalism and transcendental philosophy. It is delighting indeed to see a philosopher with 
naturalistic tendencies to actually take seriously what Kant says and engage in a real debate with him. I also 
sympathise with his general tactic: transcendental affinity and the difficult borderline between form and matter to 
which it points is exactly where I too would drive the wedge. Furthermore, his analyses of Kant’s semantics 
alone make his book worth the while, and for those interested in Kant’s philosophy of nature it is an intriguing 
work indeed. It is my hope that the problems and shortcomings presented in this article would allow Westphal to 
further clarify and solidify his interesting position.  
 
